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ERNESTO ALVEREZ, : Case No. 20050468-SC 
Defendant/Petitioner. : 
Contrary to the state's brief, Mr. Alverez respectfully requests that this 
Court reverse the court of appeals opinion because Mr. Alverez was seized under 
the Fourth Amendment and the totality of the circumstances in this case did not 
create a reasonable articulable suspicion that he was involved in drug activity. 
Moreover, this Court should reverse because under the totality of the 
circumstances, the facts of this case did not give the officers probable cause to 
conduct a forcible bodily search. Likewise, the force the officers used to conduct 
that search was not reasonable in this case. Accordingly, this Court should reverse 
the court of appeals opinion. 
POINT 1. THE OFFICERS CONDUCTED A LEVEL TWO DETENTION OF 
MR. ALVEREZ WHEN QUESTIONING HIM REGARDING THE LACK OF 
INSURANCE ON THE VEHICLE HE WAS DRIVING. 
Mr. Alverez was not free to leave when the officers questioned him about 
the uninsured status of the vehicle he was driving in relation to a violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 41-12a-302 (1998).1 Although the state maintains that the encounter 
was voluntary even though officers questioned Mr. Alverez about this insurance 
violation, Mr. Alverez was not free to leave during this questioning. R.88:6. 
Because "[a] level one encounter 'is a voluntary encounter where a citizen may 
respond to an officer's inquiries but is free to leave at any time,'" Salt Lake City v. 
Ray, 2000 UT App 55, Tf 11, 998 P.2d 274), the encounter in this case, where 
officers were questioning Mr. Alverez regarding a misdemeanor violation made it 
such that a reasonable person under the circumstances would not have believed he 
was free to leave. 
On the other hand, it is well established law that a level two encounter is a 
seizure under the Fourth Amendment and must therefore be justified by reasonable 
suspicion of criminal wrongdoing. State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, f 35, 63 P.3d 
650. "A level two encounter involves an investigative detention that is usually 
characterized as brief and non-intrusive." Id. Under the facts of this case, the 
officers knew the vehicle of which Mr. Alverez was operating was not insured. 
R.88:10. In fact, the very first thing the officers questioned Mr. Alverez about was 
the lack of the insurance. Id. at 6. Officer Walling testified: "[initially when I 
stopped the complainant I asked - or the defendant I asked him if he knew the 
vehicle that he was driving was uninsured." Id. To which Mr Alverez's response 
was: "How'd you know that?" Id. An affirmative statement by a police officer 
1
 Utah Code Ann. § 41-12a-302 makes it a class B misdemeanor for a driver to 
knowingly operate an uninsured motor vehicle on the highways of the state. 
2 
that you are violating a law is not a circumstance under which a reasonable person 
would feel he or she was free to leave. State v. Smoot 921 P.2d 1003 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1996). 
Imperative to the determination of whether an encounter was voluntary or a 
seizure is "whether defendant 'remained, not in the spirit of cooperation with the 
officer's investigation, but because he believed he [was] not free to leave.1" State 
v. Struhs, 940 P.2d 1225, 1227 (Utah Ct. App. 1997)(internal citations omitted). 
Thus, "'the test for when the seizure occurred is objective,' and a seizure occurs 
'only if, in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable 
person would have believed that he was not free to leave.'" Id. Surely, the state is 
not advocating that a citizen is free to leave when a police officer confronts him or 
her about that citizen's violation of law when the officer has a reasonable 
suspicion of the violation as in this case. 
In fact, once a police officer has "articulable suspicion" that a defendant has 
committed or is about to commit a crime and seizes the defendant by confronting 
and questioning the defendant about the crime, if the defendant attempts to flea he 
or she is subject to criminal charges. Accord State v. Smoot, 921 P.2d 1003, 
1005-6 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). For instance, in Smoot police officers received a 
report from a citizen that the defendant knew a lot about recent burglaries, causing 
suspicion. Id. The officers located the defendant and first engaged in innocent 
questions and requested to see his identification. Id. There was no dispute 
between the parties that this initial encounter was voluntary. Id. at 1007. 
3 
However, the police officers then found that the defendant had several 
outstanding bench warrants and advised the defendant of this fact Id. The officers 
engaged in a conversation as to whether they would serve the warrants. Id. At 
this point, the officers had an articulable suspicion of criminal activity and had 
a/erted the defendant thereof; he was no longer free to leave. Id. Once the 
officers advised the defendant they were going to serve the warrants, the defendant 
attempted to leave. Id. In connection to this attempted flight, the defendant was 
charged with Interfering with an Officer. Id. Contrary to the state's argument, a 
person who is being questioned by officers regarding a crime is not free to leave. 
As in our case, in Smoot the Utah Court of Appeals did not determine 
whether the initial detention was a level one or level two because it found that the 
officers initially had reasonable suspicion to detain the defendant under a level two 
stop. Id. at 1006-7. What is clear from Smoot, is that once an officer advises a 
defendant of a definite criminal violation, for instance the outstanding bench 
warrants in Smoot, or like the lack of insurance in this case, a defendant is seized 
for purposes of the Fourth Amendment and he is no longer free to leave and 
disregard the officer's confrontation and resolution of the violation of law. 
Moreover, if the defendant does leave once the officer has articulated his 
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, the defendant is subject to further 
criminal charges. Smoot 921 P.2d at 1005-6. In addition, if someone who is 
accompanying the defendant urges the defendant to leave or flee once such 
suspicion is articulated, that third party may also be subject to obstruction of 
4 
justice criminal charges. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-306 (2005)( "(1) An actor 
commits obstruction of justice if the actor, with intent to hinder, delay, or prevent 
the investigation, apprehension, prosecution, conviction, or punishment of any 
person regarding conduct that constitutes a criminal offense:... (f) provides a 
person with transportation, disguise, or other means of avoiding discovery or 
apprehension;.. .(g) warns any person of impending discovery or 
apprehension"(emphasis added)). 
When the state engages in this prong of its argument, that the encounter 
was voluntary, what is conspicuously and saliently missing from its analysis is the 
fact that the officers initially seized Mr. Alverez based on the lack of insurance on 
the motor vehicle he was operating and that the very first question directed to Mr. 
Alverez concerned this very issue. R.88:6 (Officer Wahlin testified: "[initially 
when I stopped the complainant I asked - or the defendant I asked him if he knew 
the vehicle that he was driving was uninsured."). Instead the state focuses on the 
supposed physical lack of a show of authority, lack of activated squad car lights, 
lack of display of weapons, lack of blocking defendant's egress, and lack of intitial 
use of physical force. Respondent's brief at 8-9. However, a seizure can occur 
"when the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has restrained 
the liberty of a citizen . . . " INS v. Delgado. 466 U.S. 210, 213 104 S. Ct. 1758, 
80 L.Ed. 247(1984) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1968)(emphasis 
added)). In fact, a seizure results whenever a person believes he or she is not free 
to leave. Ray, 2000 UT App 55 at ^ 11. In this case, by demonstrating to Mr. 
5 
Alverez that the officers are aware of an outstanding violation of Utah law on 
behalf of appellant, they are effectively showing authority such that Mr. Alverez 
would not feel free to leave. 
The state argues that the United States Supreme Court has long "'endorsed5 
the proposition that police officers can approach individuals as to whom they have 
no reasonable suspicion and ask them potentially incriminating questions. " 
Respondent's brief at 10 (citation omitted)(emphasis added). Rather than the 
police officers merely asking "potentially incriminating questions," in this case the 
police officers clearly showed authority by demonstrating, the very first thing, that 
they had reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, thus indicating Mr. Alverez 
was not free to disregard their questioning. Id. at 10. See R.88:6 (Officer Wahlin 
testified: "[ijnitially when I stopped the complainant I asked - or the defendant I 
asked him if he knew the vehicle that he was driving was uninsured."). 
Thus, the state's reliance on this "potentially incriminating questions" 
analysis is misplaced. The appellant does not argue that "potentially incriminating 
questions" were posed to seize him, but rather outright accusatory questioning 
which indicated that Mr. Alverez was not free to leave. It is incriminating, not 
"potentially incriminating" to ask the defendant whether he was aware that he was 
in violation of Utah law. Thus, this case is distinguished from the case on which 
the state relies to establish this proposition, INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210 (1984). 
In Delgado, acting pursuant to warrants issued on a showing of probable cause that 
numerous unidentified illegal aliens were employed at California Davis Pleating 
6 
Co., the INS conducted two factory surveys at the company. In addition, a third 
survey was conducted pursuant to the employer's consent. Id. at 211-12. 
During these surveys, "the agents approached employees and . . . asked 
them from one to three questions relating to their citizenship." Id. at 212. In its 
analysis, the United States Supreme Court cited to Florida v. Rover, 460 U.S. 491 
(1983), stating it "plainly implies that interrogation relating to one's identity or a 
request for identification by the police does not, by itself, constitute a Fourth 
Amendment seizure." Delgado, 466 U.S. at 216. Compare Brown v. Texas, 443 
U.S. 47 (1979)(officers violated Fourth Amendment by detaining defendant 
without reasonable suspicion after he refused to identify himself). However, as 
indicated supra in Rover, the Supreme Court considered the officers' statement 
"that an investigation has focused [on the defendant]" in the totality of the 
circumstances in determining whether "a reasonable person would have believed 
that he was not free to leave." Rover, 460 U.S. at 491. 
Thus, while the Supreme Court has held that "mere police questioning does 
not constitute a seizure," that questioning cannot convey a message that 
compliance with [the officers'] request is required, "which is exactly the message 
conveyed by accusatory statements and questions." Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 
429, 434-435 (1991). For instance, the questions posed in Delgado are 
appreciably distinct from the questioning in this case. For instance, in Delgado, 
the questions were such as "where [individual employees] were from and from 
what city"; "where [individual employee] was born"; and "where are your 
7 
papers?" Delgado, 466 U.S. at 219-20. The United States Supreme Court held 
that "[tjhe manner in which respondents were questioned, given its obvious 
purpose, could hardly result in a reasonable fear that respondents were not Free to 
continue working or move about the factory." Id. at 221. 
However, this analysis would be different had the INS agents, armed with 
information about a specific individual's criminal violation, questioned that 
individual by asking "do you know that you are in this country illegally without 
the proper paperwork?" It is doubtless that if an agent's question accused a 
specific individual, rather than merely questioning generally where that individual 
was bom, that individual would no longer feel free to leave. In fact, the officers in 
this case did not engage in any preliminary questioning that is typical of a level 
one, voluntary encounter. The officers did not request Mr. Alverez's identification 
or registration of his vehicle, did not ask him what he was doing at the complex, 
and did not inquire about the reason for his frequent visits to the complex in the 
past two days. 
The encounter was not characteristic of a level one stop because the officers 
did not even engage in the preliminary, potentially incriminating questions, that 
are normally used to either gain or dispel reasonable suspicion. Rather, the 
officers immediately signaled to Mr. Alverez that they had a right to seize him by 
alerting appellant that they knew the vehicle he was operating was not insured. 
Furthermore, other jurisdictions have held that consideration of an officer's 
accusatory statements or questions are a relevant factor under the totality of the 
8 
circumstances in determining whether a defendant was seized. U.S. v. Little, 60 
F.3d 708, 712 (10th Cir. 1995)(consideration of "[a]ccusatory, persistent, and 
intrusive" questioning a factor in the totality of the circumstances test is proper); 
U.S. v. Saperstein, 723 F.2d 1221, 1226 (6th Cir. 1983)(definite statement by DEA 
agent that he had information about the defendant and his "probable activities as a 
drug courier" was a factor to be considered within the totality of the 
circumstances); U.S. v. Millan, 912 F.2d 1014, 1016 (8th Cir. 1990)(officer 
showing his badge for a second time along with his questioning and statement that 
he suspected defendant of carrying drugs in his pocket turned consensual 
encounter into a Terry stop); State v. Jason, 2 P.3d 856, 862 (N.M. 
2000)("[Q]uestions asked in an 'accusatory, persistent, and intrusive' manner can 
make 'an otherwise voluntary encounter .. .coercive.'"(citation omitted)); In re 
J.G., 726 A.2d 948, 953 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999)(recognizing that 
"[generally, courts throughout the country have ruled that a field inquiry becomes 
a terry stop upon 'unsupported outright accusations of criminal activity.'"). 
While the incriminating and accusatory question alone signals that this was 
a level two detention, other factors support a level two detention. These factors 
include a "stealthy approach,"2 "failure to issue a warning or citation before 
engaging in additional questioning,"3 "a coercive show of authority,"4 "block[ing 
2
 State v. Struhs, 940 P.2d at 1227. 
3




the path of Mr. Alverez's] vehicle,"5 and "accusatory" or "investigatory 
questions."6 As argued in petitioner's opening brief for certiorari review, the 
officers used a "stealthy approach" in confronting Mr. Alverez. See Petitioner's 
Brief 11. Both officers waited for Mr. Alvarez behind a full-sized van parked next 
to the vehicle he was driving. R. 88:5-6. The officers stepped out, in full uniform, 
and cut off Mr. Alverez as petitioner was attempting to approach his vehicle. 
R.88:5-6, 15, 21. The officers confronted Mr. Alverez about the insurance 
violation. Id. Wahlin then subjected Mr. Alverez to a series of accusatory 
questions that indicated both that he was in violation of law and suspected of being 
engaged in illegal activity. In Florida v. Rover, 460 U.S. 491 (1983), two of the 
factors the United States Supreme Court considered in the totality of the 
circumstances test to determine that defendant was seized for Fourth Amendment 
purposes were that "the officers identified themselves as narcotics agents, [and] 
told Royer that he was suspected of transporting narcotics." Id. at 501-2. 
Thus, when determining the level of an encounter between an officer and a 
citizen, it is proper for this Court to use an officer's statement that an investigation 
has focused on the individual or an officer's accusatory questions or statements as 
a factor under the totality of the circumstances test. Consideration of this i actor is 
consistent with the U.S. Supreme Court precedent as well as case law from other 
jurisdictions. In this case, the totality of the circumstances surrounding Mr. 
5
 Struhs, 940 P.2d at 1227-28. 
6
 State v.Hansen, 2000 UT App 353, K 14. 
10 
Alverez's encounter with officers indicate that "a reasonable person would have 
believed that he was not free to leave." U.S. v. Mendenhall 446 U.S. 544, 554 
(1980). Therefore, Mr. Alverez was seized for purposes of implicating the Fourth 
Amendment. 
POINT II. OFFICERS DID NOT HAVE A REASONABLE SUSPICION TO 
EXCEED THE SCOPE JUSTIFYING THEIR INITIAL DETENTION. 
As Petitioner indicated in his opening brief on certiorari, reasonable 
suspicion existed regarding the lack of insurance on the vehicle Mr. Alvarez was 
driving, allowing the officers to engage in a level two detention. Petitioner's Brief 
10. However, while the officers were justified in detaining Mr. Alverez to 
question him about the vehicle's lack of insurance, the expanded scope of their 
detention must have been "supported by reasonable suspicion of more serious 
criminal activity." State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1132 (Utah 1994). 
The state argues that the officer's further detention was supported by a 
reasonable suspicion that Mr. Alverez was "selling or buying drugs." 
Respondent's brief at 15. The state relies on State v. Markland. 2005 UT 26, 112 
P.3d 507 as controlling of this issue. However, Markland is distinguishable from 
the facts of this case. In Markland, the officers received a complaint of a 
screaming or crying for help near the east side of an apartment complex at 3:14 
a.m. Id. at f 2. The officers arrived to the location within five minutes. Id. Upon 
arrival to the east side of the apartment complex, the only person located in the 
11 
area was the defendant. Id. The defendant was carrying two over-the-shoulder 
cloth bags and was walking toward a dead end of a poorly lit street. Id. 
The officers confronted the defendant and asked whether the defendant had 
heard any screams in the area to which he responded negatively. Id. at j^ 3. The 
officer then asked where the defendant was going, to which the defendant 
responded he was going home which was approximately twenty blocks away. Id. 
The officer was aware that the direction in which the defendant was walking led to 
a dead end, which did not correspond with his claim to be going home. Id. Thus, 
the officer requested identification from the defendant and ran a brief warrants 
check. Id. Both parties agree that this elevated the encounter to a level two 
detention. Id. at f^ 10 n.l. The officer found that the defendant had an outstanding 
warrant, arrested him, and found drug paraphernalia, methamphetamine, and 
marijuana during a search incident to arrest. Id. at f 3. 
Although Markland's facts amounted to reasonable suspicion, the facts in 
this case are inapposite to those in Markland. First, the report is distinguished by 
the type of report and the police response in each case. In Markland, the report 
was at approximately 3 a.m. of possible screams or cries for help to which the 
officers responded within five minutes and the defendant was the only person 
found in the specific area where the screaming was reported. Id. at f^ 2-3. In this 
case, the officers had received a general report from an unknown source that the 
vehicle of which Mr. Alverez was driving was "possibly" dealing drugs at a 
location twenty blocks away. See Petitioner's Brief at 3-4 (emphasis added). The 
12 
officers did not have a report that drugs were being sold or purchased at the 
specific apartment complex where they happened to located Mr. Alverez, nor did 
the report detail what type of drugs were suspected. The police did not respond to 
a report within five minutes, but rather were "just taking a chance that day to see if 
anything was going to come in and out of there." R.88:9. 
In addition, the officers in Markland first engaged in preliminary questions 
in order to establish or dispel reasonable suspicion. For instance, the officers in 
that case asked whether the defendant had heard any screams in the area and 
where the defendant was going. Markland, 2005 UT 26 at 1 21. The defendant's 
answers were "inconsistent with the observable facts," which further "heightened 
the already unusual nature of the individual's presence behind the apartment 
complex, far from his home, at so late an hour." Id. Thus, in furtherance of his 
investigation, the officer requested the defendant's identification. Id. However, in 
this case, the officers never even engaged in preliminary questions in order to 
validate the vague report. 
Rather, the officers first questioned Mr. Alverez whether he was aware the 
vehicle he was driving was without insurance, then launched into accusations of 
drug dealing, and then proceeded to a search by requesting Mr. Alverez open his 
mouth and show the officers. The officers did not ask Mr. Alverez what he was 
doing at this location, why he had frequented the location, whether he lived at the 
location or for any identification but instead engaged in accusations and a request 
for a bodily search. R.88:6-7. The officers' actions in this case were not like 
13 
those in Markland where the officers appropriately dealt with a report from an 
unknown source by engaging in preliminary questions. Those preliminary 
questions helped the officers ascertain whether or not the defendant had a 
legitimate purpose for being in the area, or in other words whether there was 
reasonable suspicion for a level two detention. The officers, in this case, engaged 
in no such conduct. 
Regarding the report in Markland, this Court stated the "question is not 
whether a noncriminal explanation for the cries might exist, but whether [the 
officer] could have reasonably suspected that criminal activity was afoot 
considering his knowledge of the reported cries for help and the additional 
information obtained during his subsequent investigation'' Markland, 2005 UT 
26 at \ 25, n.2 (emphasis added). That additional information unearthed that the 
defendant's answers to preliminary questions did not correlate with the facts the 
officer observed and included an identification check to further aid the detective in 
that determination. No similar procedure was involved in this case. The analysis 
in Markland would only be applicable to this case if the officer responded to the 
defendant in that case with accusations of criminal wrongdoing and then 
immediately requested to search the defendant's cloth bags similar to the 
accusations in our case immediately followed by the request to look into Mr. 
Alverez's mouth. 
There was no reasonable suspicion in this case comparable to that 
ultimately gathered in Markland after the officers engaged in an appropriate 
14 
preliminary investigation. Unlike the early hour, the unlikely story, and the 
identification check in Markland, in this case as argued in petitioner's brief, the 
totality of the circumstances surrounding the encounter did not rise to a reasonable 
suspicion. See Petitioner's Brief at. 15-22. The facts in this case consisted of an 
uncorroborated "narcotics intelligence report" based on an unknown source that a 
vehicle Mr. Alverez was driving was "possibly" dealing drugs at a location twenty 
blocks away. See Petitioner's Brief at 16. The officers never established whether 
Mr. Alverez was in fact the owner of the vehicle in question or asked any other 
preliminary questions. 
The next factor consisted of two short stay visits to an apartment complex 
of which the officers did not know whether or not Mr. Alverez resided. Moreover, 
the officers did not have any specific information that drugs were being sold from 
anywhere in the complex and did not observe any conduct that would have 
indicated drugs were being sold there. Id. The final factors were a bottle of water 
and a facsimile of Jesus Malverde observed inside the vehicle which the trial court 
gave "very little weight." Id. 
"None of these factors, either singly or in the aggregate, necessarily 
indicate wrongdoing as opposed to innocent actions by [Mr. Alverez]." State v. 
Sykes, 840 P.2d 825, 828 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). Nor, do the totality of these 
factors create a "particularized and objective basis for suspecting" that Mr. 
Alvarez was engaged in criminal activity. State v. Steward, 806 P.2d 213, 215-16 
(Utah Ct. App. 1991)(quotations and citations omitted). 
15 
The state, in a footnote, argues that petitioner's reliance on Florida v. J.L., 
529 U.S. 266, 120 S.Ct. 1375, 146 L.Ed.2d 254 (2000) and State v. Case, 884 P.2d 
1274 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) is misplaced because the police officers' actions in 
those cases was "based solely on the tip of the anonymous informant" or the 
"unsubstantiated dispatch report." Respondent's Brief at 18, f.n.6. However, the 
anonymous tip in J.L. is very similar to the tip the police acted on in this case to, 
according to the state, justify reasonable suspicion to suspect that Mr. Alverez was 
involved in drug activity. The tip in JJL was from an anonymous caller to the 
police that a young black male wearing a plaid shirt, standing at a particular bus 
stop, was carrying a gun. J.L., 529 U.S. at 268. The police responded to the bus 
stop and found a group of young black males, one of which was wearing a plaid 
shirt. Id. The group of males was just standing there and there was no indication 
that they were carrying a gun or engaged in any criminal activity. Id. Yet, the 
police officers frisked them and found a weapon on one of the males. Id. 
Just as in J.L., the only reason the officers in this case suspected Mr. 
Alverez of drug activity was because of the anonymous report that the vehicle he 
was driving was "possibly" involved in drug transactions. The identifying factors 
in JJL. were the description of the young male and the location. In this case, the 
identifying factor was the vehicle in which Mr. Alverez was driving. Just as in 
J.L., the officers in this case did not ask preliminary questions that would develop 
or dispel reasonable suspicion, but rather immediately accused and attempted to 
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search the defendant. For full analysis of this argument see Petitioner's Brief on 
Certiorari Review at 18. 
In Case, the officers also acted on a dispatch report that was of a possible 
car burglary. The report described a male in a white shirt, possibly Hispanic with 
a "chunky" build. Case, 884 P.2d at 1275. The officer stopped a vehicle leaving 
the area with a passenger who appeared to fit the description. Id. The officer 
smelled alcohol upon confronting the occupants of the vehicle and arrested the 
driver for DUL Id. Just like in J.L., in Case, the Utah Court of Appeals held that 
the report merely provided descriptive information and the police acted without 
the necessary articulable facts of why the stop was made. Id. at 1278. Both JUL 
and Case analyze the reliability of anonymous tips and whether these unverified 
tips alone rise to reasonable suspicion. In this case, the officers merely saw Mr. 
Alverez on two occasions on short-stay visits, with bottled water in his vehicle and 
a facsimile of Jesus Malverde. These facts, along with an unreliable anonymous 
report of the vehicle "possibly" being involved in drug activity, do not rise to 
jeasonable suspicion. See Petitioner's Brief 18-20. 
Therefore, the officers' questioning regarding drugs exceeded the 
permissible scope of the detention in violation of the Fourth Amendment. See 
Petitioner's Brief 13-22 for a complete analysis of this point. 
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POINT III. THE OFFICERS VIOLATED THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
WHEN THEY FORCIBLY CONDUCTED A WARRANTLESS SEARCH OF 
MR. ALVEREZ WITHOUT THE NECESSARY SHOWING OF EXIGENT 
CIRCUMSTANCES. 
The officers were not privy to information before or during the detention, 
nor was there anything in Mr. Alverez's behavior during the detention that gave 
officers a clear indication that drugs would be found in his mouth. See 
Petitioner's Brief at 23-27. 
In this case, the only information the officers had prior to detaining Mr. 
Alverez was that the vehicle he was driving was listed on a narcotics intelligence 
report as possibly dealing drugs twenty blocks away, two short stay visits to a 
complex where Mr. Alverez may reside, a bottle or water and a facsimile of Jesus 
Malverde. After Mr. Alverez was detained, he responded to the officers' 
accusatory questions and statements without any difficulty. Officer Walling did 
not notice any unsightly or unusual bulges in Mr. Alverez's mouth and even 
indicated that Mr. Alverez "talked quite well." R.88:16-17,19. The officers did 
not see Mr. Alverez put anything into his mouth. Officer Walling asked to search 
Mr. Alverez's mouth not because he had probable cause to believe Mr. Alverez 
was carrying drugs but because it is a standard question he asks of those he 
perceives to be drug dealers. In sum, when Mr. Alverez began to swallow, the 
officers were acting on no more than a bare suspicion that Mr. Alverez had drugs 
in his mouth. The totality of factors did not amount to probable cause needed to 
justify a forcible search of Mr. Alverez. 
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Even if the officers had a clear indication that drugs would be found in Mr. 
Alverez's mouth, exigent circumstances did not exist justifying their forcible 
search. As argued in Petitioner's Brief, the only evidence the state presented was 
the officer's belief that if Mr. Alverez was carrying drugs in his mouth the drugs 
would be packaged in balloons. Further, Officer Steed testified that the 
significance of the bottle of water in the car was that "[i]n the past when [he] had 
been involved in an initiation of, say traffic stops that contain person that [he] 
believed to have narcotics [he has] seen them use that water to swallow drugs that 
they contained in their mouths." R.88:29. 
In Petitioner's Brief, State v. Hodson, 907 P.2d 1155, 1158 (Utah 1995) 
(Hodson II), is cited for support that swallowing balloons filled with narcotics 
does not give rise to exigent circumstances. The state argues that petitioner's 
reliance on Hodson II is misplaced because Hodson II only held that officers' use 
of force was unreasonable. Respondent's Brief at 26. While it is true that this 
Court only overruled the court of appeals determination of the reasonableness of 
the search procedure, this Court's review of the state's "justification for the force 
used" is instructive. The state argued that the justification for the use of force was 
"the need to preserve evidence and protect defendant from harm." Hodson II, 907 
P.2d at 1158. This Court stated: 
The justification for the force used in this case is the need to preserve 
evidence and protect defendant from harm. However, we do not know, and 
cannot ascertain from the record, any of the necessary facts which might 
have supported a reasonable fear by the officers that swallowing the plastic-
wrapped chips would render their contents nondiscoverable or harmfiil to 
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the defendant. There is considerable indication in the cases cited by both 
parties that drug dealers commonly seek to secrete drugs by means of 
swallowing, and it does not seem likely that they would routinely risk their 
own safety or lives. Furthermore, drags ingested in this manner can only 
follow two paths: Either they will pass through the system intact because of 
their packaging, or they will be absorbed into the bloodstream of the 
swallower. In either event, they are susceptible to identification and 
recovery in supervised, nonviolent post-arrest settings. 
Id. 
This Court's reasoning of the likelihood of drug dealers risking their own 
safety and the only "two paths" drugs swallowed can take strongly supports 
Petitioner's argument that exigent circumstances did not exist in this case. This 
reasoning also supports that the officers' use of force was not justified in this case. 
CONCLUSION 
For these reasons and those more fully set forth in Petitioner's Brief for 
Certiorari Review, Mr. Alverez, respectfully requests this Court to reverse the 
court of appeals' opinion affirming the trial court's denial of his motion to 
suppress and reverse his conviction. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^ day of December, 2005. 
vLNELSCfrj ^ DEBRAM. 
STEVEN G. SHAPIRO 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
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